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Abstract
In this paper, we give a deterministic two-step Byzantine consensus protocol that
achieves safety and liveness. A two-step Byzantine consensus protocol only needs two
communication steps to commit in the absence of faults. Most two-step Byzantine
consensus protocols exploit optimism and require a recovery protocol in the presence of
faults. In this paper, we give a simple two-step Byzantine consensus protocol that does
not need a recovery protocol.
1 Introduction
We consider the Byzantine agreement problem. Let n and f be the number of nodes (e.g., processors
or replicas) and the number of faulty nodes, respectively. In this problem, each node has an initial
value, and nodes exchange messages to reach an agreement. Specifically, we need to design a
message exchange protocol (or consensus algorithm) so that after the protocol terminates, all the
non-faulty nodes output (or commit) the same value, and this value is the initial value of some
node. In other words, the consensus algorithm must guarantee safety. Moreover, the protocol must
terminate eventually, i.e., guarantee liveness. In this paper, we consider the partially synchronous
model. Specifically, let D(t) be the transmission delay of a message sent at time t. In the partially
synchronous model, D(t) does not grow faster than t indefinitely.
Our goal is to design a two-step consensus algorithm. In one step, a node can 1) send messages,
2) receive messages, and 3) do local computation, in that order [7]. A consensus algorithm is two-
step if all non-faulty nodes can commit after two steps in the absence of faults. It has been shown
that to solve the Byzantine agreement problem by a two-step consensus algorithm, n ≥ 5f+1 must
hold [6]. Thus, in this paper, we assume n = 5f + 1.
Several two-step consensus algorithms have been proposed to solve the Byzantine agreement
problem [4–6]. These solutions proceed in rounds, and a round consists of two steps in normal
operation. However, it has been pointed out that FaB [6] and Zyzzyva [5] cannot guarantee both
safety and liveness [1]. Moreover, these consensus algorithms exploit optimism in their design and
invoke additional recovery protocols when normal operation fails [4–6]. Thus, these solutions may
need more than two steps in a round due to faulty behavior or long communication delay.
In this paper, we give a simple two-step consensus algorithm without the use of any recovery
protocol. In our solution, a round always consists of only two steps: 1) a leader, which is chosen in
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Algorithm 1: Propose: from the viewpoint of node u
Input: The initial value bin of u and lockset(r − 1)
1 ldr ← The leader of round r
2 if u = ldr then
3 Construct a Proposal message p
4 p.R ← r
/* Determine p.B and send p to all nodes */
5 if r = 1 then
6 p.B ← bin and send p to all nodes
7 else if |lockset(r − 1)| ≥ 4f + 1 then
8 if ∃ a value b such that b 6= ∅ and |{v|v ∈ lockset(r − 1), v.B = b}| ≥ 2f + 1 then
9 Let b be any value satisfying the above constraint
10 p.B ← b and send p to all nodes
11 else
12 p.B ← bin and send p to all nodes
a round-robin fashion, broadcasts a proposal, and 2) all nodes vote and collect votes. Our solution
and analysis are inspired by MSig-BFT, which is a three-step protocol [3]. Like MSig-BFT, the
leader may not be allowed to broadcast a proposal if the network is in bad condition. An interesting
property of our solution is that nodes may reach consensus in a round, even if the leader chosen in
that round is faulty or suffers from long transmission delay. Such a property can thus mitigate the
harm caused by faulty nodes and transmission delay.
2 The Two-Step Consensus Algorithm
The first step: propose. At the beginning of round r, the leader sends a Proposal message,
which contains a candidate value b and the current round r, to all nodes. We will describe this
step in detail after the next step is introduced. For a Proposal message p, p.R and p.B denote the
round in which p is generated and the candidate value contained in p. The pseudocode of the first
step is given in Algorithm 1.
The second step: vote. Once a node u receives a valid Proposal message p, u then broadcasts
a Vote message containing candidate value p.B. Note that a node broadcasts at most one Vote
message in a round. If u receives 4f + 1 Vote messages before a predetermined timeout TOcommit
expires, and these 4f + 1 Vote messages contain the same non-empty candidate value b, u then
commits b. On the other hand, if u cannot commit before TOcommit expires, u then goes to
the next round, and u needs to store the candidate value for which it votes. Specifically, let
b′ be the candidate value contained in the Vote message broadcast by u in round r. In round
r + 1, if u cannot receive a valid Proposal message before another predetermined timeout TOvote
(TOvote < TOcommit) expires, u then broadcasts a Vote message containing b
′. Note that in the
first round (i.e., r = 1), if u cannot receive a valid Proposal message before TOvote expires, u
broadcasts a Vote message containing an empty candidate value ∅. To achieve liveness in the
partially synchronous model, whenever a node goes to the next round, the lengths of the two
timeouts are doubled. For a Vote message v, we use v.R and v.B to denote the round in which v
is generated and the candidate value contained in v. We summarize this step from the viewpoint
2
Algorithm 2: Vote: from the viewpoint of node u
1 Construct a Vote message v, and set v.R ← r
/* Determine v.B and broadcast v */
2 if u receives a valid Proposal message p of round r before TOvote expires then
3 v.B ← p.B and broadcast v
4 else
5 if r = 1 then
6 v.B ← ∅
7 else
8 v′ ← the Vote message that u broadcast in round r − 1
9 v.B ← v′.B
10 Broadcast v
11 if u collects 4f + 1 Vote messages of round r containing the same value b and b 6= ∅
before TOcommit expires then
12 Commit b
13 else
14 Go to round r + 1
of node u in Algorithm 2.
The complete description of the first step: Let lockset(r) be the set of Vote messages of
round r received by node u. lockset(r) is valid if it contains 4f +1 Vote messages of round r. We
now describe the first step from the viewpoint of u in detail. Let rc be the current round. If u is
not the leader of round rc, then u goes to the second step, i.e., voting. Otherwise, if u is the leader,
u’s action depends on whether rc = 1 or rc > 1.
Case 1 (rc = 1): u constructs a Proposal message p, where p.B is the initial value of u and p.R = 1.
Case 2 (rc > 1): In this case, if u wants to send a Proposal message p, u must have a valid lockset
of the previous round, i.e., |lockset(rc − 1)| ≥ 4f +1. Otherwise, if |lockset(rc − 1)| < 4f +1, then
there is no Proposal message in round rc. For other nodes to verify this condition, the Proposal
message must contain lockset(rc − 1). We further impose a constraint on p.B. If at least 2f + 1
votes in lockset(rc − 1) contain the same candidate value b and b 6= ∅, then p.B = b. Note that
if multiple candidate values satisfy the constraint, then the leader can choose any one of them.
Otherwise, if no candidate value satisfies the constraint, u can propose its own initial value.
3 Analysis
3.1 Proof of Safety
To prove that our solution guarantees safety, it suffices to prove the following two claims. We say
a node votes for a value b in round r if the node sends a Vote message containing b in round r.
Claim 1. If two non-faulty nodes u1 and u2 commit values b1 and b2 in the same round r, respec-
tively, then b1 = b2.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that b1 6= b2. u1 (respectively, u2) receives 4f +1 Vote
messages containing b1 (respectively, b2). Hence, in round r, at least 3f + 1 non-faulty nodes vote
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for b1 and a different set of at least 3f + 1 non-faulty nodes vote for b2. Thus, there are at least
6f + 2 > n nodes, which is a contradiction.
Claim 2. Once a non-faulty node commits value b in round r, for any future round r′ > r, only b
can be committed in round r′.
Proof. Let Nb be the set of nodes that vote for b in round r. Because b is committed in round r,
|Nb| ≥ 4f +1. Let Gb be the subset of Nb that contains non-faulty nodes only. Thus, |Gb| ≥ 3f +1.
Observe that if the leader of round r + 1 has a valid lockset LS of round r, then LS must contain
at least 2f + 1 Vote messages sent from Gb. In addition, for each candidate value b
′ 6= b, at most
2f Vote messages in LS contain b′. Thus, if the leader of round r+1 can send a Proposal message
p, p.B = b must hold. Otherwise, if there is no Proposal message of round r + 1, all nodes in Gb
still vote for the value that they vote for in round r, i.e., b. In both cases, all nodes in Gb still vote
for b in round r + 1. The claim then follows by induction.
3.2 Proof of Liveness Under the Partially Synchronous Model
A standard technique to guarantee liveness under the partially synchronous model is to double the
lengths of the timeouts (e.g., TOvote and TOcommit) whenever entering a new round [2]. It can be
shown that there is some round r such that for any round r′ > r, all non-faulty nodes can receive
messages from each other before the timeouts expire [2]. Thus, in some round r′ > r+1, the leader
is non-faulty1 and has a valid lockset of round r′−1. Thus, there must be a valid Proposal message
p in round r′. All 4f + 1 non-faulty nodes then vote for p.B in round r′. Since all these 4f + 1
Vote messages can be received in time, all non-faulty nodes can commit p.B in round r′.
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